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UNFAIR COMPETITION-FALSE AnVERTISING-ScoPE OF FEDERAL Jurus-
DICTION UNDER SECTION 43 (a) OF LANHAM ACT-Plaintiff brought suit 
in a state court seeking injunctive relief, alleging unfair competition by 
defendant in manufacturing and selling slavish copies of plaintiff's swim-
suits. One of the six causes of action alleged in the complaint was based 
on a violation of section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act.1 Defendant had 
the suit removed to federal district court. On motion to remand, held, 
denied. The alleged violation of section 43 (a) created a federal right of 
action within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts. Catalina, Inc. 
v. Gem Swimwear, Inc., (S.D. N.Y. 1958) 162 F. Supp. 911. 
At common law "passing off" of defendant's goods as those of the 
plaintiff has traditionally been considered to be an essential element 
of a suit for unfair competition.2 Thus, as an example, misrepresentation 
of the quality of one's product could not become the basis of a cause 
of action by a competitor, simply because the magic element of "passing 
off" was lacking. The rule has been justified on the ground that abandon-
ment of this limitation would open to the courts a virtual "Pandora's 
1 60 Stat. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §1125(a): "Any person who shall affix, apply, 
or annex, or use in connection with any goods or services, or any container or containers 
for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, in-
cluding words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and 
shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, . . • shall be liable to a 
civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin 
or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that 
he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation." 
2 American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., (6th Cir. 1900) 103 F. 281. But cf. 
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assn. v. Fred Miller Brewing Co., (C.C. Wis. 1898) 87 F. 864. 
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box" of possible litigation.3 Notwithstanding severe cr1tic1sm concern-
ing the narrowness of the rule4 and despite a limited judicial departure 
where plaintiff had a monopoly5 or was an association of all competing 
producers in a particular geographical area,6 this requirement continued 
to be applied until passage of the Lanham Act in 1946. Section 43 (a) was 
proclaimed as establishing a federal substantive law of unfair competition 
covering all cases of false designation of origin and false description of 
goods in commerce, giving a party injured or likely to be injured by the 
false advertising the right to relief in a federal court.7 The terms of the 
statute would seem to justify this interpretation. In one of the first cases 
decided under section 43 (a), however, the Ninth Circuit rejected such an 
interpretation and continued to require "passing off" as an essential 
element of complainant's cause of action.8 While admitting that the sec-
tion could be construed otherwise, it was felt that no fundamental change 
in the existing law of unfair competition was intended. Thus that court 
would still require a showing that as a result of defendant's conduct his 
goods were being sold as those of the complainant.9 While it has been 
suggested that the facts in that case did not entitle the complainant to relief 
even under a more liberal interpretation of section 43 (a),10 the basis on 
which the court chose to refuse relief has been sharply criticized because 
it ignores both the clear language of the statute and the legislative history 
behind passage of the act.11 In L'Aiglon Apparel v. Lana Lobell, Inc.,12 
3 American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., note 2 supra, at 286. 
4' Handler, "False and Misleading Advertising," 39 YALE L. J. 22 at 37 (1929). 
5 Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., (2d Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 603, revd. on other 
grounds 273 U.S. 132 (1927). 
6 Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., (7th Cir. 1942) 127 F. 
(2d) 245, cert. den. 321 U.S. 771 (1944); Pillsbury-Washburn Flour Mill Co. v. Eagle, 
(7th Cir. 1898) 86 F. 608, cert. den. 173 U.S. 703 (1899). But see California Apparel 
Creators v. Wieder of California, (2d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 893, cert. den. 332 U.S. 816 
(1947). 
7 Bunn, "The National Law of Unfair Competition," 62 HARV. L. REv. 987 at 999 
(1949); Callmann, "False Advertising as a Competitive Tort," 48 CoL. L. REv. 876 at 
885 (1948). 
8 Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., (9th Cir. 1951) 186 F. (2d) 923. Accord, 
Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat. Sales, (D.C. Mass. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 218, affd. per 
curiam (1st Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 896. See Rosaire v. Baroid Sales Division, National 
Lead Co., (S.D. Tex. 1954) 120 F. Supp. 20, alfd. (5th Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 72, cert. den. 
349 U.S. 916 (1955), for a case in which §43(a) appears not to have been raised by counsel 
as a basis for federal jurisdiction and the district court continued to apply the "passing 
off" doctrine as a requisite to relief for unfair competition. 
9 Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., note 8 supra, at 925. 
10 Derenberg, "Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First Decade of 
the Lanham Act: Prologue or Epilogue?" 32 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 1029 at 1037 (1957). 
11 Leidy, "Competitors' Remedy for False Description," 43 TRADE-MARK REP. 1109 
at 1118 (1953); Diggins, "The Lanham Trade-Mark Act," 37 TRADE-MARK REP. 305 at 
444 (1947). 
12 (3d Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 649. The decision in this case was recently followed in 
Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., (3d Cir. 1958) 255 F. (2d) 641. 4 ToRTs RE-
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the Third Circuit reached a more realistic result, specifically rejecting the 
Ninth Circuit approach and construing section 43 (a) as going beyond the 
"passing off" doctrine. The District of Columbia Circuit13 and the court 
in the principal case have followed this view. To secure relief under sec-
tion 43 (a), plaintiff must prove (I) that defendant's advertisement is 
false, (2) that a substantial number of customers were likely to be misled, 
(3) that the misrepresentation was a material inducement to purchase 
defendant's product, and (4) that trade has been diverted or is likely to 
be diverted from plaintiff or that the good will which plaintiff's own 
product enjoyed with the buying public has been injured.14 Section 43 (a) 
should be considered as establishing an affirmative code of business ethics 
whose standards can be enforced by any competitor likely to be injured 
as a result of the false advertising.15 Although the Second Circuit has not 
directly passed on this issue, some indication of its position lies in a 
recent concurring opinion of Judge Clark, in which specific approval 
is given the Third Circuit's broad interpretation of section 43 (a).16 In 
applying this broad interpretation the principal case provides attorneys 
with another indication of the opportunities existing under the Lanham 
Act to prevent, through injunctive relief and actions for damages, the 
serious injury that is likely to result when a client's competitor engages 
in false advertising. 
John D. Kelly, S.Ed. 
STATEMENT §761 (1939), appears -to expand the basis of relief beyond the "passing off" 
doctrine in terms not unlike those used in §43(a). 
13 Gold Seal Company v. Weeks, (D.C. D.C. 1955) 129 F. Supp. 928, affd. sub nom. 
S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., v. Gold Seal Co., (D.C. Cir. 1956) 230 F. (2d) 832, cert. den. 
352 U.S. 829 (1956). 
14 Weil, "Protectibility of Trademark Values Against False Competitive Advertising,'' 
44 CALIF. L. REv. 527 at 537 (1956). 
15 Gold Seal Company v. Weeks, note 13 supra, at 940. See 1 CALI.MANN, THE LAW OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS, 2d ed., §6.2(c) (1950). 
16 Maternally Yours v. Your .Maternity Shop, (2d Cir. 1955) 234 F. (2d) 538 at 546. 
See also footnotes 1 and 5 of the opinion of Waterman, J., at 540 and 544. 
